This is the English translation of a Turkish language article that was originally published by AVİM on 17 June 2026.

In recent years, in parallel with the deepening political, economic, and social relations between Azerbaijan and Türkiye, it has been observed that assessments have been made that question the cooperation between the two countries and target the existing harmony amongst them.[1] At first glance, these approaches may be regarded merely as criticisms directed at Baku-Ankara relations. When examined from a broader perspective, however, they appear to be connected with the level of cohesion that has strengthened in the Turkic world in recent years. In this context, it can be said that such discussions indirectly target not only the relations between the two countries, but also the cooperation and integration processes developing among the Turkic states.

Criticisms Directed at the Stable Relations Between the two Sides

When these writings are examined, it can be observed that Azerbaijan-Türkiye relations are mostly evaluated within the context of relations with Israel and Armenia. In this framework, Azerbaijan-Türkiye relations are frequently discussed through Azerbaijan’s positive relations with Israel and Türkiye’s periodic tensions with Israel. However, this approach tends to interpret Azerbaijan’s foreign policy preferences and regional strategy from a narrow perspective.

While Azerbaijan maintains its relations with Israel in the diplomatic, economic, and security spheres, it is developing its cooperation with Türkiye at a much more comprehensive and institutionalized level of strategic partnership. In this process, it can be observed that Baku pursues a balanced policy rather than taking a position in favor of either side, and, when necessary, it assumes a facilitating and balancing role between Ankara and Tel Aviv. In addition, while Azerbaijan’s relations with Israel are important, its relations with Türkiye are positioned on a different strategic level. The Shusha Declaration has further institutionalized this partnership, creating a long-term and multidimensional framework of cooperation in the political, economic, security, energy, and cultural fields. Moreover, Azerbaijan’s relations with Türkiye, unlike those conducted with Israel, are built upon shared history, culture, language, and societal ties, and thus have a deeper character.

In the context of Armenia, Azerbaijan-Türkiye relations are frequently addressed together with Armenia-Azerbaijan and Türkiye-Armenia relations. In particular, following the Second Karabakh War and Azerbaijan’s restoration of its territorial integrity, assessments regarding the normalization process initiated between Türkiye and Armenia have gained prominence. This process is at times interpreted as Azerbaijan exerting a decisive influence over Türkiye’s Armenia policy. However, such assessments do not sufficiently reflect the multi-actor and multidimensional nature of the process.

From the perspective of Türkiye-Armenia relations, it can be observed that not only current developments but also historical legacy plays a determining role. Although the current Armenian administration has made various statements in favor of normalization, the occasional raising of controversial historical claims against Türkiye in international platforms, as well as Armenia’s positioning within frameworks known for anti-Türkiye sentiment, demonstrate that the nature of the relations continues to be fragile. For this reason, evaluating the Türkiye-Armenia normalization process solely on the basis of the de facto resolution of the Karabakh issue carries the risk of an incomplete reading which overlooks its historical, political, and societal dimensions. Despite Armenia’s obligations in the post-war period, its failure to complete the necessary constitutional and legal amendments indicates that the normalization and peace process has not yet fully concluded. Although Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has made statements acknowledging Karabakh as Azerbaijani territory, internal political dynamics, the influence of diaspora circles, and opposition discourse reveal that certain approaches and policies from the past have not been entirely abandoned.

The Target: Weaking the Solidarity Among Turkic States

The Organization of Turkic States (OTS), whose visibility has increased at both global and regional levels in recent years, should be taken into account as the background of the above discussions. Relations among Turkic states are increasingly acquiring an institutional character in the fields of politics, economy, security, transportation, energy, and technology, and are forming a multi-layered network of cooperation. In addition, member states maintain strong relations with one another on the basis of shared historical memory, cultural affinity, and linguistic ties.

Statements by OTS leaders describing the organization not merely as a platform for cooperation but as an important geopolitical center of power also supports this process.[2] In this context, while member states continue to effectively pursue their economic and political relations in Eurasia, their steps toward strengthening institutional cooperation among themselves also come to prominence. Within this framework, it can also be observed that certain criticisms of this integration process are at times expressed through the discourse of “Pan-Turkism.” When criticisms directed at Azerbaijan and Türkiye are evaluated in this context, the central position of both countries within OTS become evident. Türkiye, with its political, economic, and institutional capacity, plays an important role in the Turkic world, while Azerbaijan, thanks to its strategic location in the South Caucasus, its energy resources, and its influence over transportation corridors, constitutes a key connection point among Turkic states. For this reason, it can be argued that attempts to weaken the strategic partnership between Azerbaijan and Türkiye do not merely target their bilateral relations, but particularly the processes of cooperation and integration among Turkic states.